Using state-pair-year panel regressions, we find that fewer regulations on interstate branching in a state make local firms more aggressive cross-state acquirers and more resistant to outside bidders. We find that both small (private) firms and large (public) firms are less likely to be acquired by outside firms when their states have better access to bank finance due to the deregulation. Moreover, small (private) firms are more likely to acquire outside firms when their states have better access to bank finance. These results suggest that access to bank finance helps to strengthen firms' financial positions, especially for firms with greater difficulty in external financing. We also find that high-growth acquirers experience better stock performance and small acquirers experience better sales growth when their states have fewer restrictions on interstate branching, consistent with access to finance enabling firms in need to expand. While confirming the role of access to finance in cross-state M&As, we also find some evidence consistent with banks working as information intermediation for potential merger partners.
卞宇立博士，研究方向为金融数学，大数据管理，商业分析。作为审稿人审阅Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues等期刊，受邀前往纽约州立大学、香港理工大学、上海财经大学等国内外多所著名高校报告访问。